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Introduction	
Criminalisation	is	now	seen	as	one	of	the	central	issues	in	criminal	law	theory.	However,	in	spite	
of	 the	 (rather	 belated)	 recognition	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 topic,	 a	 number	 of	 fundamental	
questions	 remain	 unaddressed	 (Duff	 et	 al.	 2014)	 and,	 in	 many	 cases,	 not	 even	 openly	
acknowledged.	 I	 discuss	 three	 such	questions	 here,	 prompted	by	 the	 articles	 in	 this	 excellent	
special	issue	on	‘Hidden	Criminalisation’	and,	in	doing	so,	I	raise	a	fourth	and	broader	issue	about	
the	possible	limits	of	criminalisation	theory.		
	
The	first	of	these	questions	concerns	the	scope	of	criminalisation.	This	is	the	question	of	what	we	
mean	when	we	talk	about	criminalisation—and	this	in	turn	raises	crucial	questions	about	how	
we	should	track,	and	theorise,	criminalisation	(Farmer	2016).	In	other	words,	what	is	a	theory	of	
criminalisation?	The	second	question	is	related	to	this,	and	concerns	the	national	and	cultural	
dimensions	of	criminalisation.	It	is	not	only	a	matter	of	producing	a	‘general’	or	ideal	theory,	but	
also	understanding	the	history	and	cultural	specificity	of	particular	practices	of	criminalisation,	
and	 reflecting	 on	 how	 these	 should	 be	 understood	 and	 approached	 from	 a	 theoretical	 (and	
normative	 perspective).	 The	 third	 question	 concerns	 the	 normative	 dimension	 of	 a	 theory	 of	
criminalisation.	 The	 focus	 of	 work	 on	 criminalisation	 is	 often	 on	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 ‘over‐
criminalisation’—too	many	criminal	laws	or	too	much	punishment—and	is	arguing	for	the	need	
to	reduce	or	limit	the	criminal	law.	Alternatively,	to	focus—as	many	other	theorists	do—on	the	
‘proper’	scope	of	the	criminal	law	is	to	suggest	that	there	is	a	gauge	against	which	we	can	measure	
the	contemporary	criminal	law	in	terms	of	the	‘right’	amount	or	proper	function	of	the	law,	often	
in	terms	of	legal	moralism	or	retributive	accounts	of	punishment.	The	issue,	though,	is	whether	
these	 standards	 are	 the	 best	 or	 most	 appropriate	 ones	 for	 analysing—and	 criticising—the	
complex	phenomenon	that	is	criminalisation.	I	shall	say	more	about	each	of	these	questions	in	
turn,	 prompted	 by	 the	 sophisticated	 and	 thoughtful	 way	 that	 these	 have	 been	 raised	 by	 the	
articles	in	this	special	issue.	And	I	shall	finish	by	raising	a	fourth	question,	which	concerns	the	
limits	of	criminalisation	theory.	The	current	centrality	of	criminalisation	to	criminal	law	theory	
brings	a	temptation	to	analyse	everything	that	is	a	direct	or	indirect	effect,	or	consequence	of,	
criminalisation	decisions	in	terms	of	criminalisation.	The	question	here	is,	when	does	it	stop	being	
useful	to	analyse	something	as	criminalisation?	Or,	putting	it	slightly	differently,	is	there	a	point	
at	which	criminalisation	ceases	to	be	useful	as	an	analytical	category?	
	
Scope	
In	 an	 influential	 formulation,	 Lacey	 (2009)	 pointed	 to	 the	 distinction	 between	 formal	 and	
substantive	criminalisation:	broadly	speaking,	the	difference	between	laws	on	the	books	and	the	
patterns	of	enforcement	of	those	norms	in	the	criminal	justice	process.	She	then	went	on	to	point	
out	that	criminal	law	theory	has	tended	to	focus	on	the	former,	what	might	be	described	as	the	
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legislative	moment,	and	has	largely	neglected	the	study	of	substantive	or	empirical	patterns	of	
criminalisation.	To	this	we	might	now	add,	as	Lacey	has	pointed	out	in	her	commentary	in	this	
issue,	 the	 further	 distinction	 between	 criminalisation	 as	 processes	 or	 practices,	 and	
criminalisation	as	an	outcome;	that	is	to	say,	‘the	full	range	of	broader	social,	cultural,	economic,	
emotional	 and	 political	 effects	 of	 these	 processes’.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	 this	 sense	 of	 the	 outcomes	 of	
criminalisation	 that	 is	 raised	 in	 a	 particularly	 vivid	 way	 by	 the	 question	 of	 ‘hidden’	
criminalisation.	
	
As	Quilter	and	Hogg’s	paper	on	the	use	of	the	fine	makes	clear,	criminalisation	can	be	‘hidden’	in	
a	range	of	different	ways.	This	might	be	because	of	a	lack	of	academic	attention:	they	point	to	the	
soaring	use	of	the	fine	as	an	alternative	to	prosecution,	where	little	is	known	about	the	full	range	
of	agencies	operating	these	powers,	how	they	use	them	or	how	their	role	in	the	criminal	justice	
system	is	changing.	And,	perhaps	more	importantly,	they	point	out	that	little	is	known	about	the	
human	impact	of	fines,	in	particular	the	use	of	fixed	penalty	regimes	which	take	no	account	of	the	
circumstances	of	the	offender.	This	raises	questions	of	the	relationship	between	administrative	
systems	and	criminal	justice—and,	of	course,	of	the	outcome	of	criminalisation	in	the	sense	of	its	
impact	on	particular	individuals,	groups	or	communities.	Similar	issues	about	the	outcomes	of	
criminalisation	are	raised	in	Douglas	and	Fitzgerald’s	paper,	which	shows	how	the	system	of	
domestic	violence	protection	orders	is	leading	to	the	disproportionate	imprisonment	of	members	
of	the	Aboriginal	and	Torres	Strait	Islander	(ATSI)	communities.	The	key	part	of	their	account	is	
the	demonstration	that	a	measure	that	was	originally	established	as	a	means	of	protecting	the	
victims	of	domestic	violence—by	diverting	from	the	processes	of	mainstream	criminal	justice—
ends	up	‘enmeshing’	ATSI	people	(and	particularly	women)	within	the	criminal	justice	system,	
thereby	 reinforcing	 established	 patterns	 of	 racial	 and	 ethnic	 discrimination	 and	 oppression.	
Methven	 then	 draws	 attention	 to	 a	 further	 ‘hidden’	 dimension	 of	 criminalisation	 in	 her	
exploration	 of	 the	means	 by	which	 swearing	 at,	 or	 in	 the	presence	 of,	 a	 police	 officer	 can	be	
constructed	as	a	particular	type	of	disrespect	for	order	or	authority.	Criminalisation,	she	shows,	
is	more	than	simply	a	matter	of	legislation	plus	enforcement	(or	non‐enforcement);	it	crucially	
depends	on	a	range	of	other	(in	this	case	linguistic)	processes	which	frame	and	construct	certain	
forms	of	conduct	as	a	threat	to	the	community.	
	
These	questions	of	scope	and	outcome,	and	the	associated	methodological	issues	of	how	to	study	
criminalisation,	come	into	particular	focus	in	the	‘modalities’	approach	set	out	in	McNamara	et	
al.	 The	 authors	 are	 to	be	 congratulated	on	engaging	with	neglected	methodological	 issues,	 to	
develop	a	genuinely	innovative	approach	to	criminalisation,	one	which	seeks	to	recognise	fully	
the	complexities	of	the	topic.	They	do	this	by	seeking	to	identify	more	systematically	the	different	
modes	and	outcomes	of	criminalisation.	This	approach	thus	includes	not	only	direct	(legislative)	
criminalisation	but	also	indirect	modes	of	criminalisation—such	as	the	reduction	of	procedural	
safeguards,	 the	 downgrading	 of	 the	 classification	 of	 offences,	 or	 the	 expansion	 of	 post‐
correctional	powers—and	then	seeks	to	link	this	to	the	outcomes	of	criminalisation.	This	then	
enables	 the	authors	 to	classify	particular	statutes	across	a	 range	of	Australian	 jurisdictions	 in	
terms	 of	 specific	 forms	 (or	 modes)	 of	 criminalisation.	 The	 resultant	 picture,	 even	 at	 this	
admittedly	early	stage	in	their	research,	is	significant	both	because	it	shows	the	shortcomings	of	
a	 narrow	 focus	 on	 ‘over‐criminalisation’	 as	 merely	 the	 creation	 of	 new	 offences,	 and,	 more	
significantly,	 because	 it	 begins	 to	 reveal	 a	 much	 richer	 picture	 of	 the	 workings	 of	 the	
contemporary	‘penal’	state,	making	visible	the	hidden	processes	of	criminalisation.	
	
This	 is	 thus	an	approach	which	promises	 rich	 insights	 in	building	up	a	new	kind	of	empirical	
picture	of	criminalisation.	I	would,	though,	endorse	Lacey’s	sympathetic	comments	about	areas	
in	which	the	approach	needs	to	be	developed,	and	perhaps	add	that	this	approach,	which	retains	
a	 central	 link	 to	 the	 legislative	moment	may	 be	 unable	 to	 capture	 all	 the	 penal	 outcomes	 of	
‘hidden’	criminalisation.	
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Cultural	specificity		
Many	 of	 these	 issues	 arising	 from	 hidden	 criminalisation	 are	 general.	Quilter	and	Hogg,	 for	
example,	point	to	the	rise	in	the	use	of	the	fine	as	a	penalty	in	modern	high‐income	societies,	and	
offer	case	studies	of	Australian	jurisdictions	as	illustrations	of	these	more	general	developments.	
Likewise,	Sentas	and	Grewcock	see	changes	in	the	form	of	police	power	in	New	South	Wales	as	
a	means	of	exploring	the	relationship	between	police	power	and	criminal	law	more	broadly.	In	
both	of	these	examples,	while	there	are	specificities	related	to	the	particular	legislative	history	of	
a	measure,	the	developments	seem	to	be	capable	of	being	fitted	within	a	broader	narrative	about	
monetary	 penalties	 or	 police	 power.	 However,	 in	 some	 cases—notably	 in	 Douglas	 and	
Fitzgerald’s	analysis—the	outcomes	of	criminalisation	take	a	form	which	is	specific	to	Australia,	
linked	to	its	colonial	past	and	to	the	patterns	of	expropriation,	deprivation	and	discrimination	
that	 are	 its	 legacy.	The	question	 that	 this	 raises	 for	 the	 study	of	 criminalisation	 is	 that	 of	 the	
relationship	between	general	patterns	and	particular	developments:	whether	we	should	work	
with	a	general	 framework	of	analysis	and	see	particular	developments	as	 ‘local’	variations;	or	
whether	it	is,	rather,	the	culturally	specific	that	should	be	privileged	for	the	insight	that	this	gives	
into	broader	historical	developments.	Likewise,	the	authors	(McNamara	et	al.)	of	the	modalities	
approach	locate	it	within	a	distinctive	Australian	tradition	that	has	placed	greater	emphasis	on	
interdisciplinarity	 and	 contextual	 studies	of	 criminalisation	 (see	also	Brown	2013;	Crofts	 and	
Loughnan	2015).	However,	it	is	also	presented	as	a	general	approach—a	toolkit—that	might	be	
adopted	for	the	study	of	criminalisation	practices	more	broadly,	but	arguably	such	a	move	would	
also	 require	 some	 further	 reflection	 on	 the	 distinctiveness	 of	 the	 Australian	 approach,	 and	
whether	this	can,	or	should,	be	generalised.	
	
This	dilemma	is,	of	course,	also	played	out	at	the	level	of	normative	theory,	and	the	question	of	
how	we	should	frame	normative	categories.	As	Cane	(2002:	7)	has	pointed	out,	to	talk	of	(or	in	
the	 language	 of)	 ‘Anglo‐American	 jurisprudence’,	 as	 is	 common	 in	much	 contemporary	 legal	
theory,	 is	 to	 elide	 the	 processes	 by	 which	 the	 English	 common	 law—and	 now	 American	
variants—have	been	imposed	across	the	globe,	and	arguably	also	to	neglect	the	ways	in	which	
the	use	of	certain	normative	categories	or	linguistic	forms	is	subtly	to	reproduce	systems	of	legal	
domination.	The	language	of	legal	theory,	in	whose	terms	criminalisation	is	normally	discussed,	
is	one	which	continually	falls	back	on	categories	(wrong,	harm)	whose	very	appeal	lies	in	their	
apparent	universality	(conduct	which	is	‘wrong	in	itself’	or	‘pre‐legally’	wrong)	(Farmer	2010).	
But	this	 form	of	 legal	theory	rarely	reflects	on	the	processes	by	which	it	has	achieved	its	own	
institutional	 dominance,	 or	 the	 ways	 that	 its	 own	 categories	 and	 concepts	 are	 themselves	
inflected	with	cultural	norms	which	are,	in	turn,	linked	to	a	history	of	colonialism.	The	problem,	
therefore,	 is	 not	 simply	 one	 of	 understanding	 local	 (cultural)	 variations	 in	 terms	 of	 general	
(universal)	patterns,	but	also	requires	that	we	subject	the	‘general’	to	the	same	kind	of	critical	
and	reflexive	examination.	
	
Normative	dimensions	
This	 leads	 us,	 then,	 to	 a	 further	 set	 of	 questions	 relating	 to	 normative	 understandings	 of	
criminalisation:	 if,	 as	McNamara	et	al.	 point	 out	 in	 this	 issue,	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	modalities	
approach	is	to	provide	a	clear	empirical	foundation	for	normative	theory	building,	we	must	still	
ask	what	kind	of	normative	theory	is	appropriate.		
	
In	looking	at	this,	there	are	some	specific	questions	raised	by	the	focus	on	‘hidden’	criminalisation,	
particularly	as	this	relates	to	outcomes	(rather	than	processes).	One	of	the	points	that	comes	over	
very	 strongly	 from	 the	 articles	 in	 this	 special	 issue	 concerns	 the	 ‘hidden’	 consequences	 of	
criminalisation:	 that	 those	who	bear	 the	brunt	of	 penal	measures	 are	 very	 often	not	 those	 at	
whom	the	measure	was	ostensibly	directed,	and	that	the	consequences	of	a	conviction	routinely	
exceed	the	headline	sentence.	Now	it	is	certainly	the	case	that	it	is	recognised	that	penal	measures	
have	had	further,	and	unintended,	consequences:	imprisonment	or	fines	impact	upon	the	families	
of	the	prisoner	in	economic	and	emotional	terms;	a	conviction	may	have	an	impact	on	the	future	
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ability	of	an	offender	to	get	a	job	or	housing	or	credit,	and	so	on.1	These	impacts,	moreover,	are	
often	 not	 necessarily	 directly	 imposed	 by	 criminal	 justice	 institutions,	 but	 might	 be	 the	
consequences	of	other	individuals,	organisation	or	institutions	imposing	restrictions	because	of	
the	criminal	record	of	the	offender.	These	can	then	combine	to	have	a	devastating	effect	on	the	
lives	of	those	affected.	And	this	is	only	to	discuss	this	in	terms	of	its	impacts	on	individuals.	While	
the	sentencing	of	an	individual	(and	possibly	even	certain	‘hidden’	consequences	of	a	conviction)	
might	be	seen	as	‘justified’	in	terms	of	that	person’s	conduct	or	criminal	record,	understanding	
sentencing	patterns	against	the	backdrop	of	social	and	economic	deprivation,	or	patterns	of	racial	
and	 ethnic	 discrimination,	 raises	 a	 further	 set	 of	 issues	 about	 the	 justice	 of	 criminal	 justice	
institutions.	
	
How	can	these	kinds	of	consequence	be	captured	by	normative	theory?	One	approach	might	be	
to	focus	on	the	sentencer,	and	what	the	court	is	justified	in	taking	(or	not	taking)	into	account	
when	imposing	a	sentence.	One	problem	here	is	that	the	sentencer	may	simply	have	inadequate	
information—or	indeed	that	the	social	consequences	of	a	conviction	may	not	become	apparent	
until	some	later	time.	It	is	not	clear	that	courts,	even	if	they	were	in	possession	of	this	information,	
either	could	or	should	be	in	a	position	to	make	this	kind	of	complex	decision,	pointing	to	the	limits	
of	an	approach	focused	on	the	justifiability	of	punishment.	And,	when	we	move	to	the	social	or	
aggregate	level,	the	questions	may	concern	the	justifiability	of	individual	punishment	less	than	
the	role	of	the	criminal	justice	(and	social	and	economic)	system	as	a	way	of	allocating	social	costs	
and	 benefits	 across	 a	 population	 (Chiao	 2017).	 The	 justifiability	 of	 punishment	 (and	 of	
criminalisation),	in	other	words,	is	not	merely	a	matter	of	individual	transactions,	but	depends	
on	questions	of	social	and	political	justice.	However,	at	this	point,	although	we	are	still	concerned	
with	the	outcomes	of	criminalisation,	it	is	reasonable	to	ask	whether	these	kinds	of	outcome	can,	
or	should,	be	addressed	in	terms	of	a	theory	of	criminalisation.	
	
Limits	
What	comes	across	strongly	in	the	articles	in	this	special	issue	is	the	sense	in	which,	when	one	
focuses	 on	 the	 form,	 substance,	 and	 outcomes	 of	 criminalisation	 (or	 its	 modalities),	
criminalisation	is	a	capacious	concept—always	allowing	us	to	identify	further	consequences,	or	
apparently	 non‐punitive	 measures,	 that	 none	 the	 less	 have	 a	 penal	 impact	 on	 certain	
communities.	The	 focus	on	criminalisation	 is	powerful	precisely	because	 it	allows	us	 to	make	
visible	the	hidden	consequences	and	to	trace	the	linkages	from	legislative	enactments,	through	
selective	enforcement,	to	social	injustices.	And	this	in	turn	raises	powerful	questions	about	the	
scope	of	the	criminal	law.	However,	as	I	suggested	at	the	beginning,	it	might	also	be	important	to	
ask	about	the	limits	of	criminalisation	theory.	This	might	have	two	dimensions.	First,	we	might	
ask	whether	seeing	the	consequences	of	criminalisation	everywhere	might	dilute	the	impact	or	
explanatory	 power	 of	 criminalisation	 theory.	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 just	 because	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 see	
something	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 criminalisation	 does	 not	 necessarily	 mean	 that	 it	 is	 best	
understood	in	terms	of	criminalisation.	Second,	and	related	to	this	point,	it	is	also	necessary	to	
think	about	the	relationship	of	criminalisation	to	other	disciplines	or	other	theoretical	traditions,	
notably	to	criminology,	and	also	potentially	to	analyses	of	the	state	and	law	in	social	and	political	
theory.	One	of	the	exciting	promises	of	the	modalities	approach	is	precisely	that	it	seeks	to	draw	
on	these	existing	traditions	of	thought—and	perhaps	to	anchor	the	study	of	criminalisation	to	
acts	of	legislation.	However,	as	this	approach	develops,	it	will	also	remain	important	to	retain	a	
focus	on	questions	of	its	own	theoretical	limits.	
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